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Context, history and interpretation: the religious dimension in Descartes’s 
metaphysics1 
John Cottingham 
1. Philosophizing about the past
Although Descartes’s place in the canon of great philosophers in the Western tradition has never
been in doubt, the last few decades have seen a significant increase in the range and depth of
scholarly interest in his thought. The work of Desmond Clarke has contributed significantly to this,
and, as the editors of this volume published to honour him have noted, that contribution has been 
particularly concerned with the importance of context – in the first place, the importance of reading 
Descartes’s best known works in the wider context of his philosophical and scientific writings as a whole, 
and, in the second place, the value of studying these writings in the context of their time,
paying attention in particular to what the new Cartesian philosophy meant to his contemporaries
and immediate successors, and indeed to how the very idea of a distinctive Cartesian philosophy
took shape in the early-modern period.
There can be no doubt that the closely contextualized and historically immersed approach to 
the history of philosophy exemplified by the work of Clarke and others pays great dividends. This 
is not to say that it is the only valid way of studying Descartes’s ideas. A paradigm example of a 
rather different approach that has nevertheless greatly enriched our thinking about Descartes is that 
of Bernard Williams, who makes it clear in the preface to his seminal study, Descartes: The Project 
of Pure Enquiry, that his book is ‘intended to be philosophy before it is history.’2 This certainly 
does not mean that Williams shared the dismissive attitude of some of contemporary philosophers towards 
the history of philosophy; his book includes a great deal a of detailed reference to a wide 
range of Cartesian texts, and to how Descartes shaped his ideas in response to contemporary critics. 
But Williams believed that in the sort of history of philosophy that was fundamentally worth doing 
there had to be, as he put it, ‘a cut-off point, where authenticity is replaced as the objective by the 
aim of articulating philosophical ideas’.3 
An example of this was Williams’s idea of the ‘absolute conception’ of knowledge, which 
he attributed to Descartes, namely the goal of reaching a special kind of truth – the truth about how things 
are independently of our own local ways of conceiving them. The Cartesian project, so understood, is 
supposed to give us the kind of knowledge that is free from the relativity arising 
from the preconceptions of the local cultural context in which we operate, and even free from the particular 
perspective of our human standpoint (for example our human modes of sensory 
awareness). It is clear that Williams’s interests in this idea are not primarily derived from asking 
whether it represents a historically faithful interpretation of Descartes, but are driven instead by his 
own, very twentieth-century, philosophical concerns, for example about whether the modern 
conception of scientific inquiry presupposes that our theories about the world are constrained by 
how the world really is ‘anyway’, and hence that over time our various scientific accounts (and 
perhaps those of any other rational inquirers elsewhere in the universe) will tend to converge, as 
they approach closer to the truth, ‘guided’, as Williams put it in a later work, ‘by the way things 
actually are.’4 
In ‘history of philosophy’ understood in this way, exegesis of the canonical works is, 
ultimately, in the service of exploring the writer’s own philosophical concerns, albeit focused 
through the lens of a close reading of a historical text. To put it another way, the historical 
1 This is a draft typescript of a paper the definitive version of which will appear in S. Gaukroger and K. 
Wilson (ed.), Essays in Honour of Desmond Clarke Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
2 Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (London, 1978; repr. 2015), xv. 
3 Williams, Descartes, xvi. 
4 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London, 1985), Ch. 8, 136. 
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scholarship, both textual and contextual, is never an end in itself; the point of the exercise is to of 
bring the ideas of a writer such as Descartes into juxtaposition with the tensions and problems of 
our own contemporary worldview. Hence, for example, Williams’s interest in ‘the absolute 
conception’, and the notion of convergence, went hand in hand with what is a very unCartesian 
distinction between truth in the domain of science and in ethics.5 In ethical inquiry, unlike scientific 
inquiry, Williams was very sceptical about the possibility of convergence: he saw no prospect of a 
‘convincing theory of knowledge for the convergence of reflective ethical thought on ethical reality 
in even a distant analogy to the scientific case’.6 Whatever one makes of the resulting set of 
questions (and in my view they are rich and fascinating ones), it is clear that they take us quite a 
distance from the philosophical world of the early-modern period, certainly that of Descartes and 
his followers, for whom the ‘light of reason’ discloses indubitable facts about goodness just as it 
does in respect of mathematical truth.7 
If we contrast all this with the approach to history of philosophy found in Des Clarke’s 
work, it becomes clear, I think, that the latter is more firmly anchored in the philosophical world of 
the early-modern period than is the case with Williams. But these are to some extent matters of 
degree rather than kind. Certainly Clarke’s way of doing history of philosophy does not aim to 
immerse us so entirely in the context of the times that we lose sight of our own present day 
philosophical preoccupations. Such an aim would be in any case incoherent, since it is impossible 
for any thinker to step wholly outside the contemporary cultural and intellectual milieu that 
necessarily shapes much of his or her thinking. And indeed some of Clarke’s most interesting 
discussions, for example his account of Descartes’s view of the relation between mental and 
physical phenomena, cast light on the Cartesian position precisely by bringing it into juxtaposition 
with the views of modern writers such as Nagel, Davidson, Kripke and Putnam.8 
In short, we can agree that worthwhile history of philosophy, of the kind that the best 
historically oriented work of both Clarke and Williams exemplifies, is sensitive both to nuances of 
history and context, and to the enduring philosophical significance of the ideas studied. But we 
may nevertheless think of practitioners of the history of philosophy as falling along a spectrum, 
with at the one end those for whom (to revert to Williams’s way of putting it) the subject is ‘history 
before it is philosophy’, while at the other end lie those for whom it is ‘the other way round.’ Yet 
despite their different priorities, there is one thing on which all those who philosophize about the 
past would surely agree, namely on rejecting that deracinated conception of philosophical inquiry 
that appears, dismayingly, to be gaining ground in many parts of the philosophical academy– a 
conception which entirely ignores the philosophical legacy of the past and is entirely focused on the 
latest ‘cutting-edge’ theories advanced supposedly out of the blue, or through debate with close 
contemporaries.9 Though practised in many ways, and with many different emphases, the history of 
philosophy serves as a salutary reminder that our philosophical reasoning is never a neutral, 
ahistorical process, but has been conditioned in countless ways by the long sweep of Western 
culture which delivered us to where we are today. 
2. Context: forwards and backwards
One of the results of the ‘contextualised’ approach to the study of Descartes, clearly apparent in the
work of Clarke and others, has been a move towards interpreting Descartes’s metaphysical
5 Why this distinction is indeed ‘unCartesian’ will be explained (with suitable qualifications) in section 3, 
below.  
6 Williams, Ethics and the Limits, 152. 
7 ‘Reasons of truth’ and ‘reasons of goodness’ rank pari passu in the Fourth Meditation, AT vii. 58; CSM ii. 
40. For more on ethical knowledge in Descartes, see section 3, below.
8 Desmond Clarke, Descartes’s Theory of Mind (Oxford, 2003), Ch. 9.
9 See John Cottingham, ‘What is Humane Philosophy, and Why Is it At Risk?’, in A. O’Hear (ed.),
Conceptions of Philosophy, Royal Institute of Philosophy series (Cambridge, 2009), 1-23.
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arguments in the light of the role they play in his wider scientific agenda.10 In part, this is a 
reversion to the older view, held for example by the great Cartesian scholar and editor Charles 
Adam, that Cartesian metaphysics and epistemology are essentially subordinate to Cartesian 
science.11 Thus, in his work on Descartes’s theory of the mind, Clarke has brought out the extent to 
which Descartes was often as much or more preoccupied with working out the physical 
mechanisms that he saw as underpinning our mentation than he was with abstract metaphysical 
arguments about the supposed dualistic separation of the mental from the physical. Descartes’s 
wider scientific programme for a new style of explanation, which he hoped would replace the 
scholastic approach prevailing in the world in which he grew up, was driven by his conviction as to 
the explanatory vacuity of the ‘substantial forms and real qualities which many philosophers 
suppose to inhere in things’; these he condemned as ‘harder to understand than the things they are 
supposed to explain’.12 His own mechanistic accounts, by contrast, were supposed to have an 
immediate intelligibility, since they simply ascribed to the micro world exactly the same kinds of 
interactions with which we are familiar from ordinary middle-sized phenomena around us. As 
Clarke persuasively argues, Descartes’s efforts in Le Monde, the Traité de L’Homme and the 
Dioptrique are in large part directed to showing how what we nowadays call ‘cognitive functions’, 
such as visual perception, are investigated by Descartes in terms of brain events of a certain kind 
(‘ideas as brain patterns’ is Clarke’s slogan).13 And the same applies to non-human animals, to 
whom, as Clarke puts it, ‘Descartes readily concedes … everything that takes place in us apart from 
thought or reasoning’.14  
But what of the famous theory for which the label ‘Cartesian’ is, in today’s wider 
philosophical community, almost synonymous, the theory of the thinking self as an immaterial 
substance, totally distinct in its nature and essence from any corporeal mechanism? If we accept 
Clarke’s view that the real driving force behind Descartes’s work was the programme for ‘genuine’ 
(i.e. mechanistic) explanations of seeing, hearing, remembering, imagining and so on, the 
introduction of the incorporeal mind represents a dead end. As Clarke puts it, Descartes’s talk of a 
‘thinking thing’ was ‘true [but] uninformative’, a ‘provisional acknowledgement of failure, an 
index of the work that remains to be done before a viable theory of the human mind becomes 
available’.15 The talk of ‘failure’ is appropriate, Clarke suggests, because the Cartesian claims 
about thinking substances ‘add nothing new to our knowledge’ of them. Descartes is ‘claiming no 
more than … that, if thinking is occurring, there must be a thinking thing of which the act of 
thinking is predicated’.16 So the attribute of thinking can no more be of explanatory value that the 
Schoolmen’s attribute of gravitas or ‘heaviness’ was any use in explaining why heavy things fall. 
The charge of explanatory vacuity seems right in one way, but can nevertheless be 
misleading in so far as it tacitly assumes that Descartes must have approached the phenomenon of 
human thought and rationality with a view to seeing if it could be explained after the manner of his 
mechanistic programme for physics. This is indeed what Pierre Gassendi thought Descartes ought 
to be doing, and fiercely criticised him for failing to do: it is no more use telling us you are a 
‘thinking thing’, he objected, than telling us that wine is ‘a red thing’; what we are looking for is 
the micro-structure that explains the manifest properties.17 Descartes’s reply is instructive: he was 
utterly scathing about the very idea that one might produce some ‘quasi-chemical’ micro-																																																								
10 See for example Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics (Chicago, 1992) and Stephen Gaukroger, 
Descartes’ System of Natural Philosophy (Cambridge, 2002).  
11 ‘Descartes ne demande à la métaphysique qu’une seule chose, de fournir un appui solide à la vérité 
scientifique.’ Charles Adam, Vie et Oeuvres de Descartes [1910] in AT xii. 143. 
12 Descartes, Principia philosophiae, IV, arts. 198 and 201. 
13 Clarke, Descartes’s Theory of the Mind, Ch. 2. 
14 Clarke, Descartes’s Theory of the Mind, 75. 
15 Clarke, Descartes’s Theory of the Mind, 257 and 258. 
16 Clarke, Descartes’s Theory of the Mind, 221. 
17 Fifth Objections, AT vii. 276; CSM ii. 192-3. 
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explanation of thinking.18 If we look back at the argument of the Second and Third Meditations, 
which is the focus of this sharp exchange, we cannot but be struck by the fact that explanatory 
goals, in this sense, are nowhere in the offing. The metaphysical journey has its own momentum, 
and as the meditator goes down deep into himself ‘shutting the eyes, stopping the ears and 
withdrawing all the senses,’19 he arrives at a self-conception which leads him directly forward 
towards contemplating the ‘immense light’ of the Godhead, the infinite incorporeal being whose 
image is reflected, albeit dimly, in his own finite created intellect.20 The res cogitans or ‘thinking 
thing’ with which the meditator identifies himself may not carry any explanatory punch of the kind 
that is sought by modern cognitive science, but reflecting on its nature plays a very significant role 
indeed in guiding the subject towards the source of truth without which no rational inquiry, 
scientific or any other, would be possible.  
This is not of course to deny that one of the goals of the Meditations, is to open the way to 
knowledge of ‘the whole of that corporeal nature that is the subject matter of pure mathematics.’21 
Descartes himself clearly regarded his metaphysics as having a foundational role with regard to the 
mathematical and mechanistic scientific revolution which he hoped to inaugurate. But contextuality 
cuts both ways. Looking forward from the seventeenth century to subsequent developments, right 
down to our own time, we can indeed see how Descartes’s reductionistic mechanism with respect 
to animal and human physiology and psychology paved the way for modern cognitive science. Yet 
locating a great philosopher in the context of his time should cause us to cast our eyes backwards as 
well as forwards. In understanding the full picture we need to reflect on how Descartes’s 
philosophical outlook was shaped not just by the aspirations of the new mathematical physics that 
he helped create, but also by the older contemplative and immaterialist tradition of Plato and 
Augustine that remained at the centre of his worldview.22 Giving right and due acknowledgement 
to Descartes the scientist should not lead us downplay the role of Descartes the theistic 
metaphysician. 
 
3. The religious and ethical strands in Descartes’s metaphysics 
If we are to be properly sensitive to the more traditionalist aspects of Descartes’s thinking just 
referred to, we need to pay close attention to the connotations and resonances of the language he 
uses in his metaphysical writings. Growing numbers of contemporary anglophone philosophers 
seem want to model their writing style on an austere, impersonal template reminiscent of that found 
in the scientific journals.23 But all philosophical discourse, whether we like it or not, is charged 
with manifold resonances, cultural connotations, and layers of meaning, and Descartes’s writing is 
no exception. One prominent example of this is the image of the light, which appears at many 
crucial points along the meditator’s journey towards the truth. The nightmare of doubt in the First 
Meditation leads the protagonist to wonder if he will ever be able to get back into the light, or 
instead remain lost in ‘inextricable darkness’ – in the original Latin, tenebrae, a term pregnant with 
religious significance in the culture in which Descartes was raised. The ancient Tenebrae liturgy for 
Holy Week commemorates the ‘darkness’ that fell over the land at the death of Christ – a darkness 
eventually to be dispersed as the day breaks on Easter morning. It does not need any explicit 
allusion in Descartes’s text for these connotations to have been subliminally operative for his 																																																								
18 Fifth Replies, AT vii. 359; CSM ii. 248. 
19 Third Meditation, opening sentence. 
20 Third Meditation, AT vii 51; CSM ii. 35. 
21 Fifth Meditation, AT vii 71; CSM ii. 49. 
22 For the Augustinian influence, see Stephen Menn’s magisterial study Augustine and Descartes 
(Cambridge, 1998).  
23 A development that is implicitly welcomed by many, for example Brian Leiter, when he speaks 
approvingly of the ‘naturalistic revolution in philosophy’, according to which philosophy should ‘either ... 
adopt and emulate the method of successful sciences, or ... operate in tandem with the sciences, as their 
abstract and reflective branch.’ The Future for Philosophy (Oxford, 2004), Editor’s Introduction, 2-3. 
PRE-PUBLICATION	DRAFT:	NOT	FOR	GENERAL	CIRCULATION	OR	CITATION		 5 
contemporary readers: the darkness of ignorance and confusion will be dispelled by the ‘immense 
light’ that appears at the end of the Third Meditation. 
A preliminary glimmer of light appears the Second Meditation, with the meditator’s 
indubitable awareness of his own existence, and this is generalized, at the start of the Third 
Meditation, by a declaration of confidence in the truth of whatever I perceive very clearly and 
distinctly. Not long afterwards we have the first explicit introduction of the term lumen naturale – 
the ‘natural light’, corresponding to what in Descartes’s much earlier work, the Regulae, or ‘Rules 
for the Direction of our Native Intelligence’, had been called the lux rationis, the ‘light of reason’.24 
Metaphors of light and sunshine as an analogue for our apprehension of the intelligible world go 
back at least to Plato, and someone might suggest that there are no particularly religious overtones 
in all this, just a convenient image for clarity of intellectual vision, of the kind that is so simple and 
obvious, that you can see the truth in question, ‘with the mind’s eye’, as we say, as if it were right 
there in front of you. Certainly this is an important part of the story, as we see from Descartes’s 
own later definition of clear perception, where he describes it as what is ‘present and open to the 
attentive mind, just as we say we see something clearly when it is present to the eye’s gaze.’25 But 
in an age of faith such as the seventeenth century, and for a religiously educated individual such as 
Descartes, the religious connotations of the imagery of light and darkness would also have been 
inescapable. ‘Let there be light’, ראוֹ  ְיִהי (yehi or), or in the Vulgate fiat lux, is of course the very 
first pronouncement of God in the Bible (Genesis 1:3), and the image of the divine as source of 
light shining in the darkness is recapitulated in Christianity’s seminal theological text, the first 
chapter of the Gospel of John. 
Descartes was persuaded by the authors of the Second Set of Objections to set out his Third 
Meditation argument for God in geometrical terms, but the resulting formal presentation has not 
impressed critics either then or since, and if we look carefully at the text of the Third Meditation it 
soon becomes clear that a purely formal treatment cannot fully capture what is going on as the 
meditator struggles out of darkness towards the divine light. The key to the struggle is the 
meditator’s awareness of his own creaturely imperfection, which plays a pivotal role in his reaching 
for God. ‘How could I understand that I … lacked something, and that I was not wholly perfect, 
unless there were in me some idea of a more perfect being which enabled me to recognize my own 
defects by comparison?’ (The phrasing, incidentally, echoes almost word for word that of 
Bonaventure in his Itinerarium mentis in Deum, the ‘Journey of the Mind towards God’, four 
centuries earlier.)26 My awareness of my weakness and finitude carries with it, for Descartes, an 
implicit and immediate sense of something other than, and infinitely beyond, myself, which 
necessarily eludes my mental grasp. This crucial point is aptly seized on by Emmanuel Levinas in 
his discussion of the Meditations. On Levinas’s view (as expounded in a perceptive essay by Hilary 
Putnam): 
 
What Descartes is reporting is not a step in a deductive reasoning, but a profound religious 
experience, an experience which might be described as the experience of a fissure, of a 
confrontation with something that disrupted all his categories. On this reading, Descartes is not 
so much proving something as acknowledging something, acknowledging a Reality that he 
																																																								
24 For the lumen naturale see Third Meditation (AT vii. 40; CSM ii. 28, and subsequently). For the lux 
rationis, see Descartes, Regulae ad directionem ingenii [c. 1628], AT x. 368; CSM i. 14. 
25 Descartes, Principia philosophiae, Part I, art. 45. 
26 Qua ratione intelligerem me dubitare, me cupere, hoc est, aliquid mihi deese, & me non esse omnino 
perfectum, si nulla idea entis perfectioris in me esset, ex cujus comparatione defectus meos agnoscerem? 
(Third Meditation, AT vii. 46; CSM ii. 31). Cf. Bonaventure: Quomodo sciret intellectus hoc esse ens 
defectivum et incompletum, si nulla haberet cognitionem entis absque omni defectu? (Itinerarium mentis in 
Deum [1259], Part III, §3). 
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could not have constructed, a Reality which proves its own existence by the very fact that its 
presence in my mind turns out to be a phenomenological impossibility.27  
 
 Despite the conventional image of Descartes as the pure ‘rationalist’, working towards the 
truth by logic alone, his encounter with the divine involves much more than detached, abstract 
reasoning, and is grounded in something like a directly apprehended relationship, that of creature to 
creator; we are dealing with an awestruck encounter, of a kind not wholly unlike those described in 
a number of striking episodes in the Bible, in the stories of Adam, or Abraham, or Moses, down to 
Samuel and the prophets.28 And in case you think that this is forcing Descartes into a channel that is 
quite alien to his purely rationalistic mode of philosophizing you have only to look at the passage 
which brings the Third Meditation to a close: 
 
Here I should like to pause and spend some time in the contemplation of God.. and gaze at, 
wonder at and adore the beauty of this immense light. Placet hic aliquamdiu in ipsius Dei 
contemplatione immorari . . . et immensi hujus luminis pulchritudinem . . . intueri, admirari, 
adorare.29  
 
The verbs, piled one upon another, intueri, admirari, adorare, ring out almost like a litany, or 
prayer, and the faculties involved are not just intellectual. Wonder is involved – one of the passions 
that was later to be discussed by Descartes in the Passions of the Soul, his treatise on ethics and 
psychology.30 God, the source of the ‘light of reason’ that drives Cartesian science, emerges here in 
the Third Meditation not as epistemic guarantor of the axioms for science (that will come later), but 
as the fountain of all truth and goodness, the ‘immense light’ towards which finite creatures must 
reach out, not just in a spirit of cold rational inquiry, but in awe and wonder, as their hoped-for 
future destiny and source of their present joy, as Descartes explicitly declares in the closing 
sentence of the Third Meditation.31 
 Two crucial passages in Descartes’s Replies to Objections serve as valuable confirmation 
for this rich religious strand in Descartes’s philosophizing in the Meditations, showing beyond 
doubt that his way of doing philosophy is not confined to the ‘left-brain’ mode of detached 
reasoning and abstract intellectual analysis.32 The first is a brief but highly significant comment in 
the Replies to the First Objections, where Descartes observes that when we attend to the perfections 
of God, we should not so much try to understand them as to surrender to them, or in the graphic 
Latin phrase, non tam capere quam capi – not so much to grasp them as to be grasped by them.33 
Modern philosophy in most of its branches (the philosophy of religion not excepted) tends to 
																																																								
27 Hilary Putnam, ‘Levinas and Judaism’, in S, Critchley and R. Bernasconi (eds), The Cambridge 
Companion to Levinas (Cambridge, 1986), 33-70, at p. 42. The relevant Levinas text is Ethique et infini 
[1982], transl. as Ethics and Infinity (Pittsburgh, 1985), 91ff.  
28 Genesis 3:9; Genesis 22:1; Exodus 3:5; 1 Samuel 3:4; Isaiah 6:8. 
29 AT vii. 52; CSM ii. 36. 
30 Les passions de l’âme [1649], arts. 70–72. 
31 The former, says Descartes, is apprehended through faith, the latter known by experience. Third 
Meditation, AT vii. 52; CSM ii. 36. 
32 For more on the distinction between left and right brain modes of awareness, the former detached, 
analytical, impersonal, the latter more intuitive, imaginative and holistic, see Iain McGilchrist, The Master 
and His Emissary (New Haven, 2009). It should be added that associating these two modes of awareness 
with the right and left hemispheres, respectively, is something of a schematic approximation, as McGilchrist 
himself stresses. There is evidence to suggest that in most people the respective functions do broadly 
correlate with neural activity in the relevant halves of the brain, but in normal subjects there is constant 
interaction between the halves. 
33 AT vii. 114; CSM ii. 82. 
PRE-PUBLICATION	DRAFT:	NOT	FOR	GENERAL	CIRCULATION	OR	CITATION		 7 
operate with what I have elsewhere called an ‘epistemology of detachment’,34 standing back from 
the propositions to be scrutinized in a cautious spirit of clinical aloofness. Some of this is no doubt 
in accord with Descartes’s own method of doubt, his determination to ‘bend his will in the opposite 
direction’, as he puts in the First Meditation,35 so as to cautiously withhold assent from anything 
that might lead him astray. But the encounter with the divine light of reason changes all that. As 
Descartes observes in the Fourth Meditation, the clarity of certain evident truths produces a 
spontaneous and irresistible assent in the will: ex magna luce in intellectu magna consequuta est 
propensio in voluntate (‘from a great light in the intellect there followed a great propensity in the 
will’).36 When you focus on a transparent mathematical truth, or a transparent moral truth you have 
no choice but spontaneously to declare ‘yes, it’s true – to be affirmed!’ or ‘Yes, it’s good – to be 
pursued!’  
It is striking, especially perhaps for the modern reader, to see Descartes asserting that the 
scope of the ‘great light’ in the intellect encompasses the domain of ethical as well as of 
mathematical truth – Descartes takes the ratio veri (‘reason of truth’) and ratio boni (‘reason of 
goodness’) both together in the same breath.37 For many moral philosophers since Hume, the 
domains of fact and of value are sharply separated, but in Descartes’s metaphysical worldview they 
are part of the one and the same objective, divinely grounded reality. (To avoid possible 
misunderstanding it should perhaps be added that we are speaking here of the simplest and clearest 
ethical truths that are manifest to the natural light – perhaps truths such as ‘generosity is good’, or 
‘cruelty is bad’ – truths analogous in their simplicity and clarity to a simple mathematical truth such 
as ‘two plus three makes five’. Descartes’s thesis about the role of the natural light in ethics does 
not commit him to the idea that the answer to every detailed practical question about the ordinary 
conduct of life can be deduced from first principles, any more than he is committed to holding a 
deductivist view of all scientific truth.)38  
Spontaneous submission to the light, as Descartes’s argument in the Fourth Meditation 
makes clear, is the truest, the best kind of freedom for human beings. The only way such assent can 
be avoided is by turning away from the light – something human beings have the power to do,39 
and unfortunately are all too prone to do, for there are times when ‘men prefer the darkness to the 
light’ (to quote once again from the Fourth Gospel).40 True freedom as spontaneous submission to 
the light: the religious flavour of this may seem to take us very far from the image of Descartes that 
our modern secularized age prefers – the cautious, sceptical, purely rational, scientifically oriented 
thinker. But the Objections and Replies once again confirm the authenticity of the religious strand. 
In the Second Replies, Descartes makes it clear that he affirms another source of clarity and 
transparency besides the natural light of reason. He articulates the idea of a ‘double source’ of 
clarity or transparency (duplex claritas sive perspicuitas), one coming from the natural light, the 
other from divine grace.41 The latter, the lumen supernaturale, the supernatural light,42 gives rise, 
no less than the natural light, to the irresistible assent of the intellect. Critics who don’t like to think 
of Descartes as religious are prone to say when he makes a comment of this kind he must be being 																																																								
34 See John Cottingham, Philosophy of Religion: Towards a More Humane Approach (Cambridge, 2014), 
Ch. 1, § 2. 
35 AT vii. 22; CSM ii. 15. 
36 AT vii. 59; CSM ii. 41. 
37 AT vii. 58; CSM ii. 40. 
38 For the limits of deduction from first principles in science, see Discourse on the Method [Discours de la 
méthode, 1637], Part Six, AT vi. 64; CSM i. 144. For the practical side to Descartes’s ethics, the ‘earthly 
morality’ that supplements ‘angelic morality’, see Gary Steiner, Descartes as a Moral Thinker (Amhurst, 
NY, 2004). 
39 See John Cottingham, ‘Cartesian Autonomy’, in J. Cottingham and P. Hacker (eds), Mind, Method and 
Morality: Essays in Honour of Anthony Kenny (Oxford, 2010), 208-229. 
40 John 3:19. 
41 AT vii. 147-8; CSM ii. 105. 
42 Second Replies, AT vii. 148, line 27; CSM ii. 106, line 12.  
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insincere, or displaying cautious deference to the religious authorities. But in fact the remark 
closely matches his original assertion in the Fourth Meditation. From a great light in the intellect 
there comes a great inclination of the will, and the assent, says the Fourth Meditation, can be 
produced either by ‘clearly perceived reasons of truth and goodness’ or by a ‘divinely produced 
disposition of my thought’. In the light of the Second Replies, this passage can now be properly 
understood: the assent is generated either by the transparency of my rational perception (the natural 
light), or by an outflowing of the will generated by the supernatural light – the light of faith.43 
This is actually quite an orthodox position (it harks back to the teaching of Thomas Aquinas, 
for example).44 For Descartes to jump in one sentence from natural to supernatural may seem quite 
a leap to the today’s audience, but the term ‘natural’, as in ‘natural light’ can itself mislead the 
modern reader. We need to beware of assimilating it to the modern secularized sense, as in the 
contemporary use of the term ‘naturalism’, which is now used to refer to the view that ultimately all 
reality is grounded in nothing more than the empirically established phenomena described by the 
physicist. For Descartes, by contrast, as for his medieval predecessors, the terms ‘nature’ and 
‘natural’ had much richer connotations that take us well beyond the domain of merely contingent or 
empirical phenomena. Thus Descartes writes in the Sixth Meditation: ‘by “nature” I understand 
nothing other than God himself, or the ordered system of created things established by God.’45  
Yet even if we accept that the ‘natural’ and the ‘supernatural’ are both, for Descartes, 
understood in ultimately theistic terms, and even if we also grant that there are some contexts (that 
of basic mathematical intuitions perhaps) where Descartes’s conception of free and valid assent as 
spontaneous submission to the light may seem philosophically defensible, nevertheless the 
additional idea of free and spontaneous submission to the supernatural light of faith may outrage 
many modern philosophers. Is it not out of tune with the ideals of rational autonomy and 
independence that are the hallmark of good philosophy? Even on Descartes’s own terms, how 
could such submission be rationally defensible, given that the ‘revealed truths’ of faith are, ex 
hypothesi, ones that are not susceptible of confirmation by reason or indeed normal empirical 
means? Worse, doesn’t it go against Descartes’s own maxim, ‘give your assent only to what is 
clearly and distinctly perceived’?46  
This raises many fascinating questions which cannot be dealt with in the space available 
here, so in bringing this discussion of the religious elements in Descartes’s metaphysical thinking 
to a close I will confine myself instead to making one general observation, which may serve as a 
pointer for further inquiry. Of the two images of Descartes that have surfaced in the course of our 
argument, the independent, rationally autonomous Descartes that many modern philosophers prefer, 
and the religiously oriented Descartes that many would like to forget about, it is the former, the 
autonomous self-sufficient conception, that emerges on further reflection as a confused and 
untenable ideal. We may like to think that in our use of reason we are lordly, wholly independent 
beings, but the idea that we could produce a self-standing justification of the ‘natural light of reason’ 
is a fantasy. As Thomas Nagel has recently argued, in the case of our most basic logical reasonings, 
no appeal to natural evolutionary history, or pragmatic success, or any other court can ever produce 
an adequate vindication: ‘Eventually the attempt to understand oneself in evolutionary naturalistic 
terms must bottom out in something that is grasped as valid in itself – something without which the 
evolutionary understanding would not be possible.’47 We are not self-creating beings, and the idea 
that reason could validate itself is inherently absurd.  																																																								
43 AT vii. 58 lines 1-2; CSM ii. 40, lines 23-25. My argument in this section draws on material from J. 
Cottingham, Cartesian Reflections (Oxford, 2008), Part V, to which the reader is referred for more detailed 
treatments of the various ways in which God occupies a central role in Descartes’s philosophy. 
44 See for example Thomas Aquinas, De trinitate 1.1, ad 5; 1.3; Summa theologiae Ia IIae, qu. 109-114. 
45 AT vii. 80; CSM ii. 56. For various sense in which the term ‘nature’ is used in the Sixth Meditation, see J. 
Cottingham, ‘Descartes, Sixth Meditation: The External World, “Nature” and Human Experience’, in V. Chappell 
(ed.), Descartes’s Meditations: Critical Essays (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 207-223.  
46 Fourth Meditation, AT vii. 62; CSM ii. 43. 
47 Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos (Oxford, 2012), p. 81. 
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Even those sympathetic to this may still baulk at the idea of the light of faith, objecting that 
faith in such contexts boils down to no more than accepting the authority of others, and bowing to a 
given religious or cultural tradition. And of course there is an individualistic strand in much of 
Descartes’s own thought that revolts against the idea of deferring to authority.48 But as Linda 
Zagzebski’s ground-breaking book Epistemic Authority has recently demonstrated, epistemic self-
reliance turns out to be a confused and probably incoherent ideal; any rational and self-reflective 
person, she argues, must in the end be committed to believing and acting on authority.49 If that is 
right, then the question, for a rational philosopher, is not whether we can do without faith, but 
which faith we give our allegiance to.  
None of this of course means that Descartes should be interpreted as an apologist for the 
religious establishment. He is known to have been wary (for good reason) of being drawn into 
theological controversies,50 and was very scathing about the arbitrary use of power by the 
ecclesiastical authorities, such as ‘those who had Galileo condemned, confusing Aristotle with the 
Bible and abusing the authority of the Church in order to vent their passions’.51 Nevertheless, if the 
argument canvassed above is on the right lines, Descartes’s philosophy, for all its progressive 
scientific aspects, is located within an overarching epistemic and metaphysical framework that 
acknowledges our fundamental human dependence, the ‘weakness of our nature’, as the very last 
sentence of the Meditations reminds us. Descartes may have spoken of starting afresh, ‘right from 
the foundations’,52 but the very process of philosophical inquiry itself could not even begin without 
an implicit reliance on a stable rational order at the heart of things, and an implicit faith that what 
comes to us from that source will point us towards the truth. Though Descartes’s subsequent 
philosophical system will aim to appeal only to our innate human ‘good sense’,53 from the start the 
Cartesian conception of our dependent human status is one that implicitly keeps open the door to 
religious faith. Those who think we can dispense with all this, as an outmoded relic of a discredited 
world outlook, would do well to reflect on how far our own contemporary secular worldview can 
make good its implicit claim to be a rational and well-founded system of thought. 
 
																																																								
48 See for example Discourse, part one. 
49 Linda Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority (Oxford, 2012). See also J. Cottingham, ‘Authority and Trust: 
Reflections on Linda Zagzebski’s Epistemic Authority,’ European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6/4 
(2014), 25-38. 
50 See Descartes, Conversation with Burman [1648], AT v. 178; CSMK 353. 
51 Descartes, Letter to Mersenne of 31 March 1641. AT iii. 349-50; CSMK 177. 
52 First Meditation, opening sentence. 
53 ‘Le bon sens’: Discourse on the Method, opening sentence. 
